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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No.  05-2421
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
DONALD E. SIMPSON,
                       Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 04-cr-00188-1)
District Judge: Honorable  William W. Caldwell
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 28, 2006
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and BECKER*, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 30, 2006)
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
*The Hon. Edward R. Becker approved this opinion but died before it was released.           
  
2RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Donald E. Simpson appeals from the jury’s verdict and the sentence
imposed by the District Court, complaining that the District Court improperly admitted an
anonymous tip phone call and erroneously refused to consider certain character evidence
in sentencing him.   We will affirm.
Simpson was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).   The arrest arose out of an incident near the
Hall Manor housing project in the City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, involving an
altercation over a gun.  The Harrisburg police were alerted by an anonymous telephone
call indicating that “there’s a short, light-skinned black male with two other men and
somebody was yelling about a gun.”  According to the police officer’s version, when the
police arrived, several individuals left the area, but Simpson, who, according to the
officers, matched the description, did not flee.  Upon the officers’ indicating that they
wished to frisk him, Simpson declined to be searched, stating that he had done nothing
wrong.  He was then told that he would be detained for purposes of the frisk and Officer
Donofrio grabbed Simpson’s left shoulder, in response to which Simpson began to run
and a scuffle ensued.  The accompanying officer, Officer Gold, in subduing Simpson,
recovered a .9 mm handgun.
Simpson proceeded to trial before a jury at which the government introduced
testimony from Officers Donofrio and Gold, including the testimony regarding the
anonymous telephone call.  Simpson’s theory of defense was that the gun was planted by
3the police when they realized they had overreacted in subduing him.  The jury convicted
Simpson.
At sentencing, Simpson’s mother and grandmother commented upon his character
and background.   Simpson’s mother claimed that her son was innocent, in response to
which the District Court explained that the jury had found him guilty and the judge stated
that he did not “have the discretion to take into account what a good son he is or what a
good grandson he is.” 
Before us, Simpson challenges both the admission of the anonymous phone call
and the District Court’s refusal to consider his character at sentencing.  Because no
objection was lodged as to either of these alleged deficiencies at the time of trial and
sentencing, respectively, we review for plain error.  United States v. Pojilenko, 416 F.3d
243, 245 (3d Cir. 2005).  We find none.
Although we have held that an anonymous phone call tip does not provide
probable cause for purposes of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure, see, e.g.,
United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2000), we have not held that the admission at trial of
evidence of an anonymous tip is, in and of itself, plain error.   
Here, defense counsel not only did not object to the admission of the phone call
evidence, but, to the contrary, chose to refer to the tip as part of his attack on the legality
of the police action.   Counsel chose not to argue in a suppression hearing that the tip was
insufficient to constitute probable cause.  Rather, he relied upon it as part of the defense at
    1 Defense counsel’s opening address (page 23-4), cross-examination (pages 26, 35,
40-41), and closing (page 198, 201).
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trial.  Counsel having made this choice, we cannot find that the District Court plainly
erred in permitting its admission.  
Counsel repeatedly referred to the tip at various stages of trial1  and attacked the
police officers’ failure to investigate it.  We can only conclude that counsel did so as a
trial tactic.   When the defense has waived an objection to the admissibility of evidence as
a matter of strategy, it is not subject to review and, especially, not subject to review under
a plain error standard.   See Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 290-91 (3d
Cir. 2005).   Here, Simpson did not merely fail to object; rather, we are convinced upon
review of the record that he chose not to object as a strategic path, and thus actually
waived the right to complain of the admission of the evidence regarding the anonymous
tip.
Simpson also urges that the District Court improperly refused to consider evidence
of his character in sentencing him.  He urges quite properly that, post-Booker, the
sentencing guidelines are advisory, and not mandatory, and that courts are to assess “the
history and characteristics of the defendant” as part of their consideration of sentencing
factors.  18 U.S.C.  § 3553(a)(2)(A).   He contends that the District Court refused to do
so.   The District Court heard the testimony of Simpson’s mother, who stated:
Just to add to what I put in the letter that I wanted to say. I
know my son is innocent.  And I know that the way it might
look like it happened, I know it didn’t happen that way.  And
5I know my son has done some things in the past, but I also
know that he’s been trying to turn his life around.  He was
working a full time job.  He was talking about getting married
. . .  But I just want to say, I know that the way things seemed
to be, that’s not the way it is.
The judge then replied:
All right.   Ms. Banks, you understand my role in this whole
thing.   You know, this case was tried before a jury, and a jury
of twelve people concluded that Donald was guilty of the
charges against him.  And those charges carry consequences,
which I’m obliged to recognize.   And I don’t have the
discretion to take in account what a good son he is or what a
good grandson he is.   I’m sure that you think highly of him,
and I appreciate your being here this morning.  Thank you.
The judge then proceeded to sentence Simpson to the lowest possible sentence under the
guideline range, namely, 108 months.
We find some merit to Simpson’s argument.  While the government argues that the
District Court was only reacting to Ms. Banks’ claim of Simpson’s innocence, we are not
so sure that that is the appropriate reading.   The judge did not merely say that he could
not consider Simpson’s character so as to declare him innocent, but said, instead, with
respect to the “consequences,” that the court was “obliged to recognize” that he did not
have the discretion to take into account what a good son he was or what a good grandson
he was.  We think the government’s reading paints too clear a picture  of what in fact is a
bit vague.  The District Court’s sentiments appear to be more broadly based at the
“consequences,” namely, the sentence, rather than Simpson’s guilt or innocence. 
6Furthermore, the judge then proceeded to sentence Simpson at the lowest end of the
guideline range, after stating to Mr. Simpson, “Okay.  I’m sorry you’re here.”
It is unclear whether the District Court Judge was referring to Simpson’s
innocence or to the sentence he could impose.  If the latter, the Judge would have had the
discretion to take Simpson’s character into account and sentence him below the advisory
guideline minimum.  In light of this ambiguity, we will remand for resentencing.   
Accordingly, we will affirm Simpson’s conviction, vacate the District Court’s
Judgment and Commitment Order, and remand for resentencing only.   
